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Documents Similar To Immanuel Kant-Arı usun cicenorthlare.tk Saf Aklın Eleştitirisi. Uploaded by. Ferhat Akdeniz · Platon - cicenorthlare.tk Uploaded by. Elif. A. Cevizci], Ankara, Platon, Diyaloglar 1. stanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, Ahmet Arslan - İlkçağ Felsefe Tarihi 1 - Sokrates Öncesi Yunan cicenorthlare.tk Gorgias, Phaedrus and the Protreptic Rhetoric of Republic [Platon'un Doğru ETHOS: Felsefe ve Toplumsal Bilimlerde Diyaloglar ETHOS: Dialogues in.
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Hnler , stanbul, Paradigma Yaymlar, It seems that any sentence that does not answer the question but seems to be an answer is a rhetorical answer. But it should be a condition that a sentence or answer must be argumentative to be dialectical. Gorgias: Yes, of course. And from it does there come about believing without knowing, or from it [does there come about] knowing? Socrates: Rhetoric, as it seems, is a craftsman of a believing persuasion and not of a teaching persuasion about the just and unjust Plato, pp.
Rhetoric, for Plato is described as follows: …[W]hat make-up is to physical training, this is what cooking is to medicine; nay, rather this, that what make—up is to physical training, this is what sophistry is to lawgiving: and what cooking is to medicine, this is what rhetoric is to justice Plato, p. Rhetoric plays a part in justice then. But is it an important part? It is at least a negligible part.
Yet, the text gives the impression that if sophistry begins to take part in lawgiving, its part can be widened in time. Furthermore, when we think of rhetoric in its widest sense as used today, it would appear that lawmakers use rhetoric more than dialectics, or more than argumentative speech, since the masses may not understand such argumentative approaches.
They should be told what they are able to understand. To return to the dialogue, Socrates asks Callicles questions whose answers are almost obvious. Do rhetors seem to you always to be speaking for what is best, aiming at this —how because of their words the citizens will become as good as possible; or [do the rhetors] also, stirring themselves to be pleasing to the citizens for the sake of their own private [benefit while] making light of the common [good], talk to the peoples [in the different poleis] as though [they were talking] to children, trying only to please them, but, of course, without caring at all whether they will be better or worse on account of these things [that they say] Plato, pp.
Here it seems that the lawmakers, as rhetors, are only pleasing the public, since as for a democracy, this seems to be a necessity. Now I turn to the dialogue Phaedrus for a rather different angle on rhetoric.
As an art, though, rhetoric should be performed in a certain way. The dialogue, starting from e1 to b4, contains an explicit discussion of the rhetoric as an art. I will try to review some of the passages in the aforementioned parts.
The analogy is as follows; a good rhetor rhetorician can persuade a man that an ass is a horse; likewise, good words may persuade a people of a city to act for evil rather than for good. This is surely a possibility Plato identifies as able to be turned into an actuality. I never required anyone ignorant of the truth when he learns to speak, but —if my counsel means something— to master the truth and then take me up.
Lady Rhetoric says she is not in need of one who is ignorant, but also more importantly that one who wants to know the truth is in need of her.
There cannot be a way, she proposes, for a knowledgeable man to persuade someone without her. No matter how much you know the truth, it is useless if you do not use rhetoric. But by themselves, these examples do not show that rhetoric is an art. It is not possible. There are some further points that common sensically or practically, may follow from the Socratic tradition. We should keep in mind that, in Socratic dialogues, it is nearly impossible to act contrarily if you know what the truth is.
Therefore, according to Plato, if there is an art of rhetoric, it shows itself to be close to the truth. This rhetoric by Plato, I believe, can also be considered within the art of rhetoric, namely, a true rhetoric. Yunis argues that in Republic, Glaucon and Adimantus change their minds, while the dialogue progresses, about the nature of justice.
One can do little simply by following the argumentative lines of texts, so something rhetorical must be added. It is not something that is necessarily bad to do. He says that Plato somehow eliminates possible responses of the interlocutors if they were to be actual life characters and draws attention to the controllable things within the dialogue. Plato directs the course of the dialogue so as to draw the reader to the position taken by Socrates.
More precisely, it is an interaction-based notion and thus presupposes rhetoric. It is here more evident that there is no hint of deceiving the agent. The rhetoric flows from the structure. Yunis means that the protreptic technique of rhetoric does not commit itself wholly to persuasion so that it could use any legitimate and illegitimate strategy.
It can be called, in this respect, a true rhetoric. But why Republic? We can say that the protreptic rhetoric is most evident in Republic but exists in other dialogues to a certain extent as well. According to Yunis, [Republic] allows Plato to demonstrate that his protreptic endeavor is, like the just state itself, not a fantasy but entirely possible, however remote it may seem.
Glaucon and Adimantus are not and do not become philosophers in the course of the Republic. One can easily refer to the Platonic way of life and say that the knower of truth, since she can do nothing wrong, and since he cannot persuade by argumentation alone, can and must use rhetoric. However, some problems might arise: 1 assuming that Socrates speaks on behalf of Plato, one can object to what Socrates is doing in some dialogues.
For example, Benjamin A. Rider says that what Socrates is doing can be regarded as pedagogically wrong5 in some cases since he uses rhetoric instead of argumentation and this might mislead a student of philosophy Rider, , p. I partly agree, but I also suggest that Plato should not be assigned to such a pedagogical formation in terms of method but can only be thought of the asserter of truth.
Once one grasps the truth, one can by no means do anything wrong. The answer seems simple, since once one has used true rhetoric there seems no way to abuse such rhetoric. However, as it is, this may not be a good enough answer, since Plato would call any act rhetorical that rhetorically defends the opposite view to his own regardless of the fact that a sophist may also defend the contrary.
Taking the protreptic rhetoric of Plato, one can always say that the truth lies inside the texts, thus arguing the idea that Plato uses a true rhetoric is a fallacy, since the text itself asserts the truth. This seems to suggest circularity. However, the true rhetoric can only be considered as a type of rhetoric, distinct from what Plato sees as truth.
I considered the dialogues Gorgias, Phaedrus, and Republic. In sections three and four, I tried to analyse the notion of rhetoric. In this fourth section, I tried to ascertain if Plato himself uses rhetoric when he writes his dialogues.
I suggest that he seems to use a rhetoric, a protreptic one.